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BIANNUAL SURVEY

right to make a jury demand within ten days of filing.2'- The
appellate court, however, concluded that the defendant had not
waived his right to a jury trial 13 and, carrying out its duty under
CPLR 4103, afforded the defendant thirty days in which to demand
a jury. This case illustrates how, as a matter of practice, CPLR
4103 is to be applied.
CPLR 4111:

Used to specifically provide a means of interpreting
a jury verdict.

The courts should employ CPLR 4111 in cases wherein two
conflicting theories of liability are presented to the jury. In
Dore v. Long Island R.R.,2 16 the case was presented to the jury
on the issues of ordinary negligence and last clear chance. 237 The
jury rendered a general verdict and the appellate court was unable
to determine upon which theory the verdict rested. It was obvious
that the evidence produced would not support both theories. In
remanding, the court stated that when inconsistent theories are
presented to the jury, the trial court should utilize the procedure
available under CPLR 4111, which permits either the rendition
of a special verdict 23 8 or a general verdict accompanied by written
answers to written interrogatories&2 3 9
ARTICLE

42 -

TRIAL BY THE COURT

CPLR 4213: Properly utilized when essential fact absent from
record on appeal.
CPLR 4213(b) provides that in a nonjury trial, the decision

of the court shall state the facts it deems essential 2 40 However,
on appeal, when the record does not contain essential facts, the
court has three possible alternatives: (1) reverse and remand
for a new trial; (2) make de novo findings of fact; or (3) remand
24
to the court of original instance for the essential findings of fact. '
In Conklin v. State,242 the lower court failed to allocate specific
2

34CPLR 4102(a).

See Micro Precision Corp. v. Brochi, 4 App. Div. 2d 697, 164 N.Y.S.2d
454 (2d Dep't 1957).
238 23 App. Div. 2d 502, 256 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1965).
23 7
Jasinski v. New York Cent R.R, 21 App. Div. 2d 456, 461-63, 250
N.Y.S.2d 942, 947-49 (4th Dep't 1964).
238 CPLR 4111(b); see Martin Fireproofing Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
45 Misc. 2d 354, 257 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
239 CPLR 4111(c).
240 CPLR 4213; see 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, op. cit. supra note
216, 4213.09.
2414 WEINsTEIN, KORN & MLLER, op. cit. supra note 216, ff4213.09.
242 22 App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1965).
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awards to separate plots of condemned land, which was required
since the lands were not homogeneous. Therefore, the appellate
division held that the trial court had failed to provide facts which
would permit adequate judicial review, and remanded the case
to the lower court to formulate proper findings of fact. Although
the court indicated its basic reluctance to make findings of fact, it
clearly implied that it would, in appropriate circumstances, exercise
its jurisdiction as a trial court to determine the essential facts itself
under CPLR 4213.243
ARTICLE

52-

CPLR 5201:

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

Debt, a property subject to enforcement.

In the case of Fishman v. Sanders,2" the second department
held that the insurer's contractual obligation in an automobile
liability policy to defend and indemnify the insured is a debt
or cause of action capable of being attached. 245 It thus rejected
the argument that the insured's interest in the policy was purely
contingent. This position was recently reaffirmed in Seider v.
In this decision, however, Judge Ughetta, who had
Roth.24
concurred in Fishman, dissented stating that the court in Fishman
"indulged in erroneous dictum." He remarked that the insurer's
attachable because the indebtedness was not
obligation was not
2 47
absolutely payable.

It has been held, however, that a purchaser's right in airplanes
subject to a conditional sales contract, in which the vendor retained
legal title, was attachable by the vendee's creditors. This was so,
even though the vendor could recover possession of the aircraft
& 2
from the vendee or creditor upon a default in the contract.
The solution to the question of what is contingent and thus not
attachable is not readily ascertainable. In the practical light of
enforcing money judgments, it would appear that if a right or
property is able to be given a monetary value it is sufficiently
243 The appellate division generally confines the exercise of such power to
instances where the record is complete and the missing facts are of a nontechnical nature. See Mellon v. Street, 23 App. Div. 2d 210, 259 N.Y.S.2d
900 (3d Dep't 1965).
244 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2d Dep't 1962).
245 Cf. Matter of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S2d
416 (1962).
240 23 App. Div. 2d 787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1965).
2
47 Id. at 788, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 796. In support of the uncertainty of actual
indebtedness, Judge Ughetta noted that several conditions had to be satisfied
before the policy became effective and that nothing was due under the policy
until the plaintiff recovered a judgment. Ibid.
248 Intermediate Credit Corp. v. Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d
522, 245 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1963).

